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GRAPPLING WITH GEBARDI:
PARING BACK AN OVERGROWN EXCEPTION
TO CONSPIRACY LIABILITY
JACK C. SMITH†
ABSTRACT
For over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that someone
can conspire to commit a crime that he is not eligible to commit himself.
Though this broad rule seeks to prevent the exploitation of statutory
loopholes by concerted bad actors, courts have recognized narrow
exceptions to this baseline reach of conspiracy liability for nearly as
long as the rule itself. One such exception was announced in Gebardi
v. United States, a 1932 Supreme Court case concerning an early
human trafficking law that criminalized the act of transporting a
woman across state lines for prostitution. The Court held that a woman
transported in violation of this law was not guilty of conspiring with
her transporter merely because she acquiesced to the journey. In the
ensuing decades, lower courts debated the implications of the case for
other kinds of criminal conspiracies and reached conflicting
interpretations of the Gebardi exception—with some deriving broad,
categorical exceptions for large classes of actors.
This Note argues that Gebardi created only a narrow exception
requiring inquiries into both statutory construction and individual
intent. While this reading comports with recent Supreme Court
discussion of Gebardi as a narrow exception, one circuit court has since
dismissed that brief treatment and expanded the Gebardi exception to
its breaking point. This incongruence suggests further clarity and
direction are needed to ensure cohesion in an area that could implicate
a vast array of criminal statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
More than one hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
found it unremarkable that “plainly a person may conspire for the
commission of a crime by a third person.”1 For just as long, the
Supreme Court has recognized a necessary corollary: even if an actor
cannot commit an offense himself under the letter of a statute, he can
still be held responsible for conspiring with someone who can.2
Conspiracy law’s broad scope stems from a recognition that the
conspiratorial agreement itself is an “offense of the gravest character,”
which can be more harmful to the public than even the planned
offense.3 Because they are characterized by secrecy and complexity to
better “subvert the laws,” conspiracies are especially difficult to
uncover.4 This complexity facilitates more wide-ranging and repeated
conduct than an individual could achieve alone.5 In the context of
modern white-collar crime—where well-resourced actors operating in
complex schemes have ample means of concealing their conduct—the
compounded dangers of conspiracy are especially acute.6

1. United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 144 (1915). A conspiracy to commit a crime is an
independent offense in U.S. federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018). In its most essential form, the
charge of conspiracy at the federal level consists of an agreement to commit an unlawful act and
at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreed-to criminal offense. 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 678, 681 (15th ed. 1996).
2. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915). In the seminal Rabinowich case,
the Supreme Court upheld the indictments of six defendants for conspiring to conceal property
from a bankruptcy trustee, even though several of the coconspirators were not themselves
bankrupt and thus could not violate the bankruptcy statute. Id. at 87.
3. Id. at 88.
4. Id.
5. See id. (remarking that conspiracies’ dangers include “further and habitual criminal
practices”).
6. See, e.g., Brian Harrison, Breaking Free from Insanity: A White-Collar Crime Approach
to Drug War Policy, 15 U.D.C. L. REV. 129, 135 (2011) (arguing that prosecutors should
investigate an easier category of banks in the anti-money-laundering context because the other
category of banks “may have a program that appears fully compliant and any conspiracy, secret
in nature, is more difficult to investigate”); Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The
Information Culture of the Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 993 (2008) (“Certain kinds
of cases—drug conspiracies, antitrust, corporate fraud, terrorism—are difficult to investigate or
prosecute without [informants], as the government is in a poor position to obtain incriminating
information without inside help.”); Mark A. Racanelli, Bugs in the Boardroom? Congress Is
Poised To Allow Wiretapping in Federal Antitrust Investigations, 5 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2
(2006) (noting that wiretaps are useful to uncover “criminal activity by members of tight-knit
conspiracies that are difficult to investigate because of the surrounding secrecy fostered by the
loyalty of the participants” and that “[m]any . . . would argue that antitrust cartels share these
characteristics”); Ioana Vasiu & Lucian Vasiu, Riders on the Storm: An Analysis of Credit Card
Fraud Cases, 20 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 185, 218 (2015) (“[Credit card frauds] often
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Just a few decades after articulating these baseline conspiracy
principles and their justifications, the Supreme Court faced a puzzling
conspiracy prosecution that seemed incompatible with the baseline
principle, leading it to carve out a limited exception to conspiracy
liability. In the 1932 case Gebardi v. United States,7 the Court
considered a conspiracy to violate the Mann Act,8 which then
prohibited transporting “any woman or girl for the purpose of
prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose,”
regardless of whether the woman had consented.9 One of the
defendants was a woman who had been so transported, but she had
consented to the trip.10
The Supreme Court held that a woman who merely consents to be
transported in violation of the Mann Act, without more, is not guilty of
conspiring with her trafficker to transport herself.11 The Court noted
that the transported woman’s acquiescence would be present in every
case where she acted voluntarily at all, so this minimal participation
would be an “inseparable incident” of the “frequent[], if not normal[]”
case.12 Thus, the Court reasoned that Congress could not have meant
to punish this “mere consent.”13 And if that acquiescence was an
innocent part of the statutory offense, it could not simultaneously
constitute its own distinct crime as a conspiratorial agreement to

involve extensive conspiracies, some very sophisticated, crossing over many jurisdictions, which
are difficult to prevent or investigate.”).
7. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
8. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 2, 36 Stat. 825, 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2018)).
9. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 118 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 398 (1932)). The Mann Act has been
recodified and amended several times since Gebardi, with various components modernized and
made gender neutral in 1978 and 1986. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (2018) (codifying the current
version of the Mann Act); H.R. REP. NO. 99-910, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5952, 5953 (“The bill rewrites the Mann Act (‘White Slave Traffic’) to eliminate its anachronistic
features and to make it gender neutral.”); S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 3 (1977), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 41 (“[T]here is presently no Federal statute prohibiting interstate trafficking in
boy prostitutes. The Committee would extend the Mann’s [sic] Act provision against juvenile
female prostitution to include juvenile males.”).
10. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 116.
11. Id. at 116, 118, 123.
12. Id. at 121–23. The notion of voluntary conduct in criminal law differs significantly from
the modern lay understanding. See 1 TORCIA, supra note 1, § 25 (“An act is ‘voluntary’ when the
bodily movement is the product of conscious effort or determination. Conversely . . . an act is not
voluntary when it is performed during unconsciousness, sleep . . . or when it is otherwise not the
product of conscious effort or determination.” (footnotes omitted)).
13. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.
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violate the statute.14 This Note argues that careful examination of the
Court’s analytical process in Gebardi reveals a two-step inquiry for
determining whether Gebardi’s exception to conspiracy liability
applies in a particular case: first, does the criminal statute at issue
suggest participation by a third party beyond the principal actor
without punishing that third party’s conduct; and second, did the
defendant charged for that participation have a mens rea beyond
“mere consent”?
However, the Gebardi Court’s opinion is not a model of clarity, in
part because it needed to accommodate the background common law
of conspiracy and one seemingly contradictory precedent—which had
held that a transported woman could, at least theoretically, be liable
for a Mann Act conspiracy.15 Because of the Gebardi Court’s careful
dance, subsequent courts have latched onto different aspects of the
case and have read it to stand for drastically different propositions.16 In
many of these cases, courts have read Gebardi to create an all-ornothing rule, where certain classes of actors omitted from charging
statutes cannot be prosecuted for conspiring to violate those laws,
regardless of the specific defendant’s intent or conduct.17 Scholarly
commentary is not immune to this misreading either, as one recent
commenter—even in sorting through the different circuits’ treatment
of Gebardi—argued that Gebardi created a categorical exception.18
The result of this confusion is a patchwork at the margins of conspiracy

14. See id. at 121–23 (characterizing such acquiescence in the Mann Act context as an
“inseparable incident” of the underlying violation).
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II. However, not every circuit court application of Gebardi has taken this
expansive approach. See, e.g., United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1275–76 (4th Cir. 1986)
(affirming a conviction for conspiracy to commit extortion where the subject of the extortion was
also a coconspirator instrumental to the extortion, and rejecting Gebardi’s application beyond
victims who merely acquiesce in the crime); United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 20 (1st Cir.
1983) (rejecting a proposed argument that Gebardi insulated from accomplice liability a gambler
charged under a statute proscribing the business of gambling); United States v. Falletta, 523 F.2d
1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a proposed application of Gebardi to immunize someone who
aided a felon in illegally receiving a firearm).
18. See Shu-en Wee, Note, The Gebardi “Principles,” 117 COLUM. L. REV. 115, 126 (2017)
(arguing that the “necessity” of a category of actors and their “omission” from statutory liability
provide the key levers for the statutory construction inquiry, but neglecting to recognize the
additional step of considering the defendant’s intent).
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law, where prosecuting the same conduct could result in a conspiracy
conviction in one circuit but an acquittal in another.19
In 2018, a Second Circuit panel in United States v. Hoskins20
exacerbated this confusion further still by relying on Gebardi to create
an expansive “affirmative-legislative-policy exception” to conspiracy
liability.21 This new exception, derived from language in the Gebardi
opinion that could be read to suggest a policy rationale for the Court’s
holding,22 posits that certain categories of individuals are immune from
conspiracy and complicity liability when Congress demonstrates some
affirmative policy to leave them unpunished.23 The Second Circuit, in
Hoskins, explained that such a policy should be discerned from the
statute’s text, structure, and legislative history.24 Accordingly, the panel
turned to the legislative history of the substantive offense statute at
issue: the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), which proscribes
various forms of bribery of foreign officials.25 The court concluded
from this history that Congress’s policy had been to extend liability
only to the categories of defendants enumerated in the statute who
were eligible for direct liability.26
It was undisputed that these categories did not include the
defendant before the court, Lawrence Hoskins, a foreign national who
19. Compare United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding
that nonemployees of a criminal enterprise can conspire with its leader to violate the Drug
Kingpin Statute), with United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that only the
kingpin can violate the statute and no one can conspire with him to do so).
20. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2018).
21. Id. at 77–78, 80, 83.
22. In Gebardi, the Court had said, “[W]e perceive in the failure of the Mann Act to
condemn the woman’s participation in those transportations which are effected with her mere
consent, evidence of an affirmative legislative policy to leave her acquiescence unpunished.”
Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 (1932).
23. Id. This Note deals with a principle that applies to both conspiracy and accomplice
(aiding and abetting) liability. While the two theories of liability are distinct, the distinctions are
generally not relevant for this Note. See United States v. Falletta, 523 F.2d 1198, 1199–1200 (5th
Cir. 1975) (“Gebardi . . . dealt with the federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371 and its
predecessors) rather than the aiding and abetting statute. But we doubt that any distinction can
be drawn on that account, since the logic of the argument has identical force in either context.”).
Accordingly, this Note will primarily use the term “conspiracy” to refer to both modes of liability,
except when discussing cases that specifically implicated accomplice liability.
24. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 80.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1–dd-3 (2018).
26. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 77–80, 83–95. While this conclusion about the legislative history of
the FCPA is debatable, that discussion is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses instead on
the Second Circuit’s exception to conspiracy liability and its bases. Suffice it to say, the
government contended that explicit references to conspiracy and complicity liability in the
historical documents should have controlled this inquiry. Id. at 87, 92–93.
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had been accused of directing business operatives in the United States
to funnel sham consulting payments to Indonesian officials in exchange
for a multimillion-dollar contract.27 And because of the perceived
legislative “policy,” the court held that actors in Hoskins’s position
could also never be guilty of conspiring to violate the FCPA, regardless
of their actual involvement in—let alone coordination of—the criminal
bribery.28 The Second Circuit’s approach appears to presume that
classes of actors not specified by the charging statute are not liable,
absent an affirmative reason to extend conspiracy liability to the
particular class of unmentioned actors that encompasses the
defendant. This represents a complete inversion of the presumption
articulated by the foundational cases and Gebardi: that conspiracy law
covers all unspecified actors by default, with only limited exceptions.29
Despite the inconsistent readings of the lower courts, the Supreme
Court has not weighed in to provide a definitive rule, and it recently
failed to seize an opportunity to do so. In Ocasio v. United States,30 the
Court provided some insight into its reading of the Gebardi exception,
but its analysis was too cursory and its guidance incomplete—leaving
room for disagreeing lower courts to distinguish their own
interpretations. For example, the Second Circuit’s contradictory
Hoskins opinion came two years after Ocasio, but dismissed Ocasio as
relevant only to its statutory context.31 To repair the division among
the circuits, the Supreme Court must provide lower courts with more
direct guidance on this interpretive principle.32 Hoskins demonstrates
that lower courts are still willing to stretch Gebardi further and further
from its narrow holding to excuse wide swaths of defendants from
conspiracy liability—including some, like Lawrence Hoskins, who
orchestrate vast and complex criminal schemes.
This Note argues that Gebardi creates only a narrow exception
with both a statutory and an individualized inquiry—corresponding to
27. Id. at 72.
28. Id. at 95; see also id. at 77 (acknowledging that “if Hoskins did what the indictment
charges, he would appear to be guilty of conspiracy to violate the FCPA,” before laying out the
court’s exception).
29. See infra notes 137–44 and accompanying text.
30. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016).
31. See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 83. Subsequent commentary on the Hoskins case has been
similarly dismissive of Ocasio’s import for reading Gebardi. See Wee, supra note 18, at 141
(commenting on the district court’s Hoskins opinion and tracing the lower courts’ disagreement
over Gebardi’s rule but devoting just two unconnected paragraphs to Ocasio’s “cursory
treatment” of Gebardi).
32. See infra Part III.
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“when” and “to whom” the exception applies. When a charging statute
omits an actor whose participation is an “inseparable incident” of the
typical case, courts must examine the mens rea of the specific
defendant before them to determine if conspiracy liability fairly
reaches that defendant. Properly read, Gebardi does not give courts
license to explore legislative history or categorically exclude entire
classes of actors from conspiracy liability regardless of their actions.
Part I of this Note focuses on Gebardi, beginning with discussion
of the background common law principles and key precedent on which
the Gebardi Court relied. Part II then examines how courts have erred
by stretching Gebardi into a categorical interpretative principle across
statutory contexts, including the most recent expansion in Hoskins.
Part III turns to the Supreme Court’s 2016 Ocasio opinion for guidance
and elaborates on the Court’s reasoning to develop a functional “mens
rea approach” for assessing the scope of conspiracy liability as a
manageable way to apply the Gebardi exception.
I. GEBARDI AND ITS BACKGROUND
In Gebardi, the Supreme Court relied on and engaged with a few
longstanding principles of conspiracy law, as well as one key precedent
dealing specifically with the Mann Act. None of this preexisting law,
however, was sufficient to resolve the case before the Court. The cases
that have engaged most meaningfully with Gebardi have likewise
engaged with this background—or have erred in considering Gebardi
while neglecting this crucial material.33 Thus, understanding the
nuances of the Gebardi opinion and how subsequent courts have
misread it first requires exploring these background principles and
precedent. After laying the foundation of the common law doctrine in
Section A and the precedent in Section B, this Part turns to unpacking
the Gebardi opinion itself in Section C.
A. Unspecified Actors and Wharton’s Rule
American courts have long recognized the principle that began
this Note: an actor can conspire with someone to commit an offense he
is not eligible to commit himself.34 In Gebardi, the Court recognized
this principle as a preliminary hurdle to exempting from conspiracy

33.
34.

See infra Part II.
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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liability a woman transported in violation of the Mann Act.35 This
principle does admit some exceptions though, including one similarly
long-standing common law rule: Wharton’s Rule.
Wharton’s Rule, named after the influential treatise author who
articulated it, provides that an agreement to commit a crime necessarily
requiring consensual participation by two people cannot be prosecuted
as a separate conspiracy;36 the agreement merges with the crime itself.
Typically, criminal law treats an agreement to commit a criminal act
independently and separately punishable from the commission of the
criminal act itself.37 Wharton’s Rule is thus an exception to this normal
framework, where one offense includes both a criminal act and an
agreement to commit that act.38
This Rule governs many typical purchase-and-sale crimes, in
addition to several (now obsolete) sexual crimes, like adultery and
fornication.39 Beyond the logical merger of the conspiratorial
agreement with the crime, courts and commenters have also observed
an additional justification for Wharton’s Rule: agreements to commit

35. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 120–21 (1932) (“Incapacity of one to commit the
substantive offense does not necessarily imply that [s]he may with impunity conspire with others
who are able to commit it.”).
36. 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 1339, at 175 (Phila. Kay &
Brother, 9th ed. 1885) (“[P]lurality of agents is logically necessary, conspiracy, which assumes the
voluntary accession of a person to a crime of such a character that it is aggravated by a plurality
of agents, cannot be maintained.”).
37. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); 1 TORCIA, supra note 1, § 24. The
concept of merger stems from the common law, where a misdemeanor conspiracy would be
subsumed within the greater charge of the substantive felony that was its aim. Iannelli, 420 U.S.
at 777 n.11; see also Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589–91 (1961) (providing further
detail on the procedural differences at common law between misdemeanors and felonies which
justified merger doctrine). When conspiracy became a recognized felony on its own, the law
evolved such that the offenses are now separately cognizable. See Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 781 n.13
(discussing scholars’ change in attitude towards conspiracy merger in the latter half of the
nineteenth century).
38. Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 779, 781–82.
39. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (recognizing an exception
“where the agreement of two persons is necessary for the completion of the substantive crime and
there is no ingredient in the conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime”); United
States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 355 (1926) (holding that where “agreement of the parties was an
essential element in the sale, an indictment of the buyer and seller for a conspiracy to make the
sale would have been of doubtful validity”); see also State v. Law, 179 N.W. 145, 145 (Iowa 1920)
(“An agreement to commit an offense, which can only be committed by the concerted action of
the two persons to the agreement, does not amount to conspiracy.”); Shannon v. Commonwealth,
14 Pa. 226, 227–28 (1850) (“[N]othing is more ridiculous than a conspiracy to commit
adultery . . . . [I]t may be said that where concert is a constituent part of the act to be done, as it
is in fornication and adultery, a party acquitted of the major cannot be indicted of the minor.”).
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these kinds of crimes typically do not pose the same dangers to society
that conspiracy law is designed to prevent, such as a tendency toward
more generalized or sophisticated criminal conduct.40 This is because
the parties to the agreement inherent in these crimes are the only
people who participate in the offense, and “the immediate
consequences of the crime rest on the parties themselves rather than
on society at large.”41 By contrast, conspiracy can be charged
separately—and sometimes harshly—precisely because it expands the
number of actors involved in a given crime and makes feasible
additional crimes beyond that originally contemplated.42
B. The Mann Act before Gebardi
Gebardi was not the first Supreme Court case to address
conspiracy liability for women transported in violation of the Mann
Act. Nearly two decades earlier, in United States v. Holte,43 the Court
considered a demurrer to an indictment against a woman transported
in violation of the Mann Act.44 The Holte opinion, written by Justice
Holmes, distinguished Mann Act violations from the classic Wharton’s
Rule offenses.45 While at first blush the Rule may seem to cover the
case of a woman transported across state lines—after all, her presence
is required to violate the Act—there is a subtle but crucial limitation
on the Rule that renders it inapplicable in this context. The Rule
requires that the party’s consent be necessary to effect the crime, but
as the Holte Court observed, “[t]he substantive offense [proscribed by
the Mann Act] might be committed without the woman’s consent; for
instance, if she were drugged or taken by force.”46
40. Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 783–84 (citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915));
id. at 783 n.16 (citing Shannon, 14 Pa. at 227).
41. Id. at 782–83 (referring specifically to the “classic Wharton’s Rule offenses” of adultery,
incest, bigamy, and dueling before drawing generalized observations about the harms of such
agreements).
42. Id. at 778 (citing Callanan, 364 U.S. at 593–94).
43. United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140 (1915).
44. The classic formulation of Wharton’s Rule requires dismissal of the indictment before
trial because no set of facts proved could support charging the conspiracy separately from the
underlying offense. Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 775. However, some more recent courts have “held that
the Rule’s purposes can be served equally effectively by permitting the prosecution to charge both
offenses and instructing the jury that a conviction for the substantive offense necessarily precludes
conviction for the conspiracy.” Id.
45. See Holte, 236 U.S. at 145 (“[T]he decisions [holding] that it is impossible to turn the
concurrence necessary to effect certain crimes such as bigamy or duelling [sic] into a conspiracy
to commit them do not apply.”).
46. Id.
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Instead of relying on Wharton’s Rule, then, the Court turned to
the first common law principle described above—that parties can
conspire to commit an offense they cannot commit themselves—and
held that it could be possible, at least theoretically, for a woman to be
guilty of conspiring to violate the Mann Act.47 This would be the case,
the Court hypothesized, if she had suggested the trip, blackmailed the
man, and bought the railroad tickets.48 And because the case arose
from the government’s appeal from a demurrer, the Court was
required to accept the indictment’s allegations unless no set of facts
could prove the alleged crime. Therefore, the mere possibility that the
woman could double as a conspirator was sufficient.49 Holte proved to
be an important precedent for the Gebardi Court two decades later,
but was then largely overlooked in ensuing interpretations of Gebardi
until the Supreme Court revisited the case in the twenty-first century.50
C. The Gebardi Opinion
Against this backdrop, in 1932 Louise Rolfe and Jack Gebardi
appealed their convictions for conspiring to transport Rolfe across
state lines “for immoral purposes”—that is, amorous trysts—in
violation of the Mann Act.51 Because the case had gone to trial, the
Supreme Court operated with real facts and was not limited to the
realm of mere possibility as it had been in Holte.52 This difference in
procedural posture would allow for more nuance in the Court’s
decision than had been possible in the earlier decision.
The facts at trial indicated that Rolfe and Gebardi, a married man,
had been engaged in a sustained affair in Chicago and had travelled by
train to Miami, Florida, Jacksonville, Florida, and Gulfport, Mississippi
to consummate their illicit romance.53 Crucially, Gebardi had
organized the trips—he had booked the hotel rooms and purchased the
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 144 (noting that the only question presented was “to decide whether it is
impossible for the transported woman to be guilty of a crime in conspiring as alleged”).
50. See infra Part III.A.
51. See Gebardi v. United States, 57 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir.), rev’d, 287 U.S. 112 (1932). As
noted above, the Mann Act has since been updated to remove anachronistic elements, such as the
criminalization of interstate adultery. See supra note 9.
52. See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932) (“In the present case we must
apply the law to the evidence; the very inquiry which was said to be unnecessary to [reach a]
decision in [Holte].”).
53. Gebardi, 57 F.2d at 617–18; see also id. at 620 (Alschuler, J., dissenting) (noting that the
pair had been “long and intimately acquainted in Chicago”).
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train tickets.54 Rolfe had done nothing more than agree to Gebardi’s
arrangements.55
The Gebardi Court agreed with Justice Holmes’s Holte opinion
that Wharton’s Rule did not apply to Mann Act offenses.56 It departed
from Holte, however, in determining that the case could not be
disposed of with the common law principle that one who cannot
commit the underlying offense can still conspire to commit that
offense.57 Rather, the Court found that this case concerned “something
more than an agreement between two persons for one of them to
commit an offense which the other cannot commit.”58
That “something more” involves the unique role of consent in a
statute that contemplates a woman’s presence as necessary for the
crime but does not punish the minimum level of her engagement.
Essentially, there are two ways a woman could be transported in
violation of the Mann Act: (1) involuntarily, by force or incapacitation,
or (2) voluntarily, with some minimal level of acquiescence. For a
conspiracy to be possible in the Mann Act context, a woman would
have to be, at a minimum, a voluntary actor. But in all cases involving
voluntariness, the substantive offense of transporting the woman
would require her acquiescence, which is thus an “inseparable
incident” of such cases.59 And in Gebardi, this minimum, “inseparable”
conduct of merely consenting was the same agreement that was
charged as the act of conspiracy itself.60 Thus, the same principle
54. Id. at 617–18 (majority opinion).
55. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 116. While the particular facts of this case—an ongoing affair with
multiple rendezvous—might suggest Rolfe’s participation was greater than mere consent, the
appellate courts do not refer to any further action on her part. See id. (noting only that Rolfe
“consented to go on the journey and did go on it voluntarily”). Arguably, the Supreme Court’s
treatment of her participation in terms of merely consenting may have been motivated by a desire
to frame the case as the most appropriate vehicle for reform. Notably, such reframing would only
be necessary if the Court did not want to directly overrule Holte.
56. See id. at 122 (“[W]here it is impossible under any circumstances to commit the
substantive offense without co-operative action, the preliminary agreement between the same
parties to commit the offense is not an indictable conspiracy.” (emphasis added)). This express
distinction in the Gebardi opinion was arguably overlooked by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code (“MPC”), who used Gebardi’s “inseparable incident” language to describe an exception
that actually reflects Wharton’s Rule. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.06 cmt.
6(b) at 324–25, 325 n.82 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (using the
“inseparable incident” language (and citing Gebardi for the language) to capture transactional
crimes like prostitution, alcohol prohibition, and bigamy).
57. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 120–21.
58. Id. at 121.
59. Id. at 121–22.
60. Id. at 121.
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underlying Wharton’s Rule would apply with equal force in all of these
nonforce cases: the “conspiratorial” agreement would merge with the
unpunished conduct of acquiescing to the crime.
Accordingly, the Court held that it “perceive[d] in the failure of
the Mann Act to condemn the woman’s participation in those
transportations which are effected with her mere consent, evidence of
an affirmative legislative policy to leave her acquiescence
unpunished.”61 This statement economically summarizes the Court’s
observations about this unique facet of the Mann Act: the statute
contemplates the woman’s bare consent as required in many cases to
effect the criminal transportation, but it does not distinguish these
cases from totally involuntary transportations; it does not single out the
woman involved for punishment simply for being transported,
regardless of how she got in the train car. Thus, any conspiracy to
violate this unusual kind of statute requires greater participation than
the “mere consent” inherent in the principal’s underlying violation.
Notably, the “legislative policy” language refers only to the Court’s
conclusion that the statute’s structure suggests Congress must have
intended this result. In identifying a congressional policy that Louise
Rolfe go unpunished, the Court did not consult the statements of
legislators, or even a codified pronouncement of legislative purpose.
Instead of a searching inquiry of diverse sources for some definitive
legislative intent, this reference to “policy” merely stood for the
byproduct of examinations of the statute and of Rolfe’s role in the
crime—revealing in turn when and to whom the exception from
ordinary conspiracy liability applies.
In sparing Rolfe (the woman) and Gebardi (her lover-transporter)
from conspiracy liability, the Court could have created a bright-line
rule and excepted all women transported in violation of the Mann Act
from such liability. While this may have been more administrable than
the Court’s nuanced holding has proven to be, it declined to do so. The
Court prefaced its opinion by acknowledging Holte, on which the lower
court had relied exclusively.62 But rather than overrule Holte, the
Gebardi Court distinguished it. Holte did not apply, the Court said,
because the hypothetical circumstances from that case under which a
woman could violate the act were not present.63 Here, Jack Gebardi

61. Id. at 123.
62. Id. at 116.
63. See id. at 117 (“In the present case we must apply the law to the evidence; the very
inquiry which was said to be unnecessary to [reach a] decision in [Holte].”).
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had purchased the train tickets, and there was no evidence that Rolfe
“was the active or moving spirit” in the crime.64
Thus, properly read, Gebardi calls for a two-part inquiry. First, it
will only apply where a statute criminalizes some aspect of a
transaction in which one actor’s consent is an “inseparable incident” of
that conduct but is not expressly punished.65 If that prong is met, courts
must then determine whether their specific defendant’s participation
constituted “mere consent” or “the active or moving spirit” of the
crime.66 While the Court did not clarify exactly when an actor’s conduct
tips over into evidencing a “moving spirit,” the hypothetical situation
in Holte—which the Gebardi Court quoted in full—provides a useful
example: a woman would be liable where she suggested the trip,
intending to blackmail the man, and purchased the railroad tickets.67
This example demonstrates that initiative, corrupt motive, and conduct
beyond the act of agreeing to the criminal transaction are relevant
factors in determining whether an actor was the “moving spirit.” And
while lower courts have undertaken various alternative and flawed
interpretations of Gebardi in the intervening years,68 this “mens rea
approach,” focusing on the level of willfulness implicitly envisioned by
the statute and actually exhibited by a defendant, has recently found
support in the Supreme Court. The next Part of this Note dives into the
circuit courts to unpack the myriad flawed approaches, before Part III
returns to the Court for support.

64. Id.
65. At least one previous commenter has noted that the Gebardi exception acts as a
principle of construction for criminal statutes. See Wee, supra note 18, at 126 (“The Gebardi
principle as first introduced in the Gebardi case is arguably a rule of construction . . . .”). However,
Wee erred in determining that this rule of statutory construction concluded the inquiry if it
yielded a necessary class of actors omitted from liability. See id. (arguing that “necessity” and
“omission” provided the key levers for the statutory construction inquiry). As this Note argues,
Gebardi does not support categorical exclusions based purely on an actor’s status, without
subsequent inquiry into a defendant’s mens rea. Wee’s error, then, stems principally from
attributing insufficient weight to the Gebardi Court’s distinguishing Holte without overruling that
opinion. See id. at 126 & n.82 (arguing for Gebardi as a rule of categorical exclusion while
acknowledging in a footnote that the Gebardi case itself only excepted women “to the extent that
the woman transported did not display the initiative and proactivity contemplated in Holte”
(emphasis added)).
66. More precisely, courts would make this determination in judging the sufficiency of an
indictment, or on postconviction appeal to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, but juries
would make this determination at trial.
67. Gebardi v. United States, 57 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir.), rev’d, 287 U.S. 112 (1932).
68. See infra Part II.
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II. GEBARDI’S GROWTH IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS:
THE DRUG KINGPIN STATUTE AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
Some later courts apparently heeded Gebardi’s emphasis on intent
and conduct,69 but many others did not. And over the course of the
intervening eighty-six years, some courts have invoked Gebardi for a
much broader exclusion from liability than is justified by the Supreme
Court’s opinion. This is the wrong approach. To demonstrate the
divergent paths taken, this Note will focus on two contexts where more
than one federal appellate court has addressed Gebardi’s application.70
Two statutes in particular have generated multiple cases that have
reached the circuit courts, and each has produced conflicting
interpretations of Gebardi’s exception. First, in the late 1980s, multiple
courts faced Gebardi-based challenges to indictments for conspiring to
violate the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) statute, which
provides harsher penalties for individuals who supervise a large-scale
drug operation, on top of what the individual drug transactions
themselves might yield. Second, the FCPA has seen Gebardi challenges
reach the appellate courts twice—both with potentially significant
results for the Department of Justice’s charging policy in this
infrequently litigated area.
A. The Continuing Criminal Enterprise—“Drug Kingpin”—Statute
The CCE statute—also known as the “drug kingpin” statute—
subjects leaders of drug organizations with at least five subordinates to
additional prosecution beyond mere participation in a continuing
criminal enterprise.71 These kinds of organizations present precisely

69. See supra note 17 (collecting cases).
70. A third context, Hobbs Act extortion, is considered infra Part III.A., when discussing
the Supreme Court’s missed opportunity to resolve the disuniformity.
71. The relevant text of the statute provides:
(b) Life imprisonment for engaging in continuing criminal enterprise
Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be imprisoned for
life and fined in accordance with subsection (a), if—
(1) such person is the principal administrator, organizer, or leader of the
enterprise . . . .
(c) “Continuing criminal enterprise” defined
For purposes of subsection (a), a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise
if—
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter . . .
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations . . .
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the dangers that conspiracy law is designed to combat: secret, complex,
and repeated criminal activity. The question several courts faced was
whether other actors besides the kingpin could conspire with him to
violate the CCE. Courts quickly determined that the statutorily
required subordinates—the enterprise’s “employees”—could not
conspire with the kingpin to help him achieve kingpin status; such a
result would effectively convert the statute into a general enterpriseparticipation law.72 The more divisive question, however, was whether
individuals outside the enterprise—“nonemployees”—could conspire
with the kingpin.
In United States v. Amen,73 the Second Circuit held that a
nonemployee of a criminal enterprise could never conspire to violate
the kingpin statute.74 The court reasoned that the statute was meant
only to more severely punish an organization’s leader—no one else.75
While this holding may seem sensible, the court reached it in part by
relying on a mistaken reading of Gebardi’s holding. The court first
identified two classes of actors apparently considered by the CCE
statute: the “top brass” and the “lieutenants and foot soldiers.”76 It then
cited Gebardi for the overbroad proposition that “[w]hen Congress
assigns guilt to only one type of participant in a transaction, it intends
to leave the others unpunished for the offense.”77 And because
Congress had only defined punishment in the CCE statute for “those
who lead,” it followed—in the court’s view—that Congress necessarily
excluded “those who do not lead.”78 The Second Circuit then
supported this finding with an extensive discussion of the legislative
history of the CCE statute and what it viewed as the practical

(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer,
a supervisory position, or any other position of management . . . .
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)–(c) (2018)
(emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Congress, in
establishing such harsh penalties for being a drug kingpin, could not have intended to subject
mere aiders and abettors [such as those who the kingpin organizes, supervises, or manages] to
equivalent penalties. . . . Otherwise there would be no differential punishment for the kingpin.”).
73. United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987).
74. Id. at 381.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985)).
77. Id. (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 (1932)).
78. Id.
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difficulties of distinguishing employees from nonemployees in this
context.79
This inaccurate rendering of Gebardi errs twice: first, by eliding
that opinion’s nuance and casting its holding as a bright-line rule; and
second, by applying Gebardi to actors whose conduct is entirely
severable from the statutory offense. As previously described,80
Gebardi did not draw blanket distinctions between “transporter” and
“transported” and then conclude that a transported woman could
never be a coconspirator. It follows, then, that the Amen court’s
categorization of “leaders” and “non-leaders” misses Gebardi’s
emphasis on individual conduct and intent. More fundamentally,
though, applying Gebardi to the question of CCE nonemployees at all
skips over the preliminary inquiry into how common or necessary these
actors’ participation is—that is, whether their agreement is ever an
“inseparable incident” that merges with the substantive offense.
Plainly, the statute contemplates the CCE employees’ participation,
but it says nothing about those external to the enterprise, so their
agreement would never merge with the offense. That is, their
participation would never constitute the same conduct made illegal by
the CCE and would always be a separate act.
The effect of the Second Circuit’s interpretation is thus to invert
the Gebardi exception. Rather than identifying specific defendants
who are excluded from the default presumption of eligibility for
conspiracy liability, the Second Circuit’s version identifies a specific
class alone who are included in liability to the exclusion of all others,
effectively closing off all conspiracy and complicity liability under this
statute. This inversion drastically expands the exception’s scope—to
the point of potentially swallowing the rules of conspiracy and
complicity whole.
Three years later, in United States v. Pino-Perez,81 the Seventh
Circuit faced virtually the same question the Second Circuit had—but
reached the opposite conclusion. There, Judge Posner, writing for the
en banc court, declined to apply Gebardi to exculpate nonemployees
who conspired with the kingpin, despite the fact they were not covered

79. Id. at 381–82. The court deemed such a distinction “unworkable” and provided examples
of various actors to illustrate its point: the kingpin’s lawyer, his bodyguard, and a businessman
who leases the kingpin a boat for smuggling. Id. at 382.
80. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
81. United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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by the letter of the CCE statute.82 He read Gebardi to stand for the
principle that “members of a group that the criminal statute seeks to
protect . . . cannot be charged as an aider and abettor.”83 Thus, Judge
Posner still read Gebardi incorrectly as creating a kind of categorical
exception. His exception just inserted a different category from the
Amen court: excepting a protected class rather than simply an omitted
one.84
Just like the Second Circuit in Amen, the Seventh Circuit here
made no mention of either Gebardi’s emphasis on acquiescence or that
Gebardi exempted only some transported women. But even though
this “protected class” reading of Gebardi was incorrect, it nonetheless
resulted in the same outcome as a proper reading: the exception from
conspiracy liability does not apply to CCE nonemployees. After
dismissing Gebardi’s application to nonemployees, the Seventh Circuit
proceeded to issue the straightforward holding that people who aid a
kingpin and are not “supervised, managed, or organized by him” could
be liable for aiding and abetting the kingpin.85
The Seventh Circuit engaged directly with Amen while
recognizing—and criticizing—its contrary outcome.86 In fact, the court
pointed out that no cases outside the Second Circuit had held the
aiding and abetting statute “totally inapplicable to a federal criminal
statute.”87 Judge Posner pointed out the dramatic implications of the
Second Circuit’s version of the Gebardi exception:

82. Id. at 1231.
83. Id. at 1232.
84. Notably, the MPC cited Gebardi to support this very proposition, though only with a
“cf.” signal and only as support in addition to the classic statutory rape case of Regina v. Tyrrell,
[1894] 1 Q.B. 710 (Eng.). MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.06 cmt. 9(a) at 324 n.74
(AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). While the outcome of Gebardi
certainly aligns with the victim-protection principle of the MPC and Tyrrell, this Note’s position
is that its reasoning and nuanced holding do not support such a standalone victim exception.
Some courts have advanced this “protected class” exception with more nuance, accounting
for a defendant’s particular mens rea and conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d
1267, 1275–76 (4th Cir. 1986) (reading Gebardi’s holding to include that “[w]hen an individual
protected by such legislation exhibits conduct more active than mere acquiescence . . . he or she
may depart the realm of victim and may unquestionably be subject to conviction for aiding and
abetting and conspiracy”). In Spitler, the court affirmed a conspiracy conviction for the subject of
a Hobbs Act extortion because he could not “be deemed a mere extortion victim whose
conduct . . . Congress chose not to criminalize.” Id. at 1275.
85. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1232. This holding created a direct split with the Second Circuit,
which remains unresolved today.
86. Id. at 1233.
87. Id.
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It would introduce great uncertainty into federal criminal law if the
liability of a conceded aider and abettor depended on the results of
an inquiry into Congress’s intent concerning such liability in creating
the offense. . . . Yet that is the inquiry required by Amen. . . . [Amen]
could even be interpreted to mean that unless a specific intent to
punish aiders and abettors appears in the legislative history of a
criminal statute . . . aiding and abetting violations of the statute is not
a crime. That approach would essentially abolish federal aider and
abettor liability.88

While the Pino-Perez court also acknowledged the Amen court’s
practical concerns89—that is, its “rhetorical questions and classroomtype hypotheticals”—it found that the well-established standard for
aiding-and-abetting liability took care of these line-drawing issues.90
That standard, articulated a half century earlier by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Peoni,91 provides that an aider and abettor
must “in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he
participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he
seek by his action to make it succeed.”92 This “Learned Hand
Standard” would prevent, for example, a policeman who participated
in an isolated incident of gang protection from being prosecuted as a
kingpin’s accomplice, because “[a]iding and abetting implies a fuller
engagement with the kingpin’s activities.”93 Thus, Pino-Perez
illustrates not only that there are multiple ugly patches in the Gebardi
quilt, but also that conspiracy and complicity law may already have
built-in mechanisms to address concerns with the potential for unfair
expansion of conspiracy liability—undermining one of the Second
Circuit’s primary justifications for its broad reading of Gebardi.
B. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The second statute to which multiple appellate courts have applied
some version of Gebardi’s exception is the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. The FCPA prohibits three specific kinds of defendants from

88. Id. at 1234. Of course, Judge Posner’s concerns regarding legislative history have been
amplified famously by Justice Scalia, who observed, “In any major piece of legislation, the
legislative history is extensive, and there is something for everybody.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997).
89. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1235.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
92. Id. at 402.
93. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1237.
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offering bribes (payments or “anything of value”) to foreign officials
and political parties.94 While the Amen and Pino-Perez courts had
faced virtually the same question over Gebardi’s application in the
CCE context, Gebardi has been invoked in two very different contexts
under the FCPA. First, the Fifth Circuit considered the liability of bribe
takers, as opposed to bribe payors, in United States v. Castle.95 And
most recently, the Second Circuit’s Hoskins opinion addressed the
liability for foreign actors who worked with Americans to bribe
officials.
In the two-paragraph Castle decision, the Fifth Circuit easily
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that two Canadian officials
could not be liable for conspiracy to violate the FCPA and expressly
adopted the lower court’s opinion as its own.96 There, the Canadian
defendants allegedly received bribes from the U.S.-based Eagle Bus
Company in exchange for a contract to provide exclusive bus service
for the Saskatchewan provincial government—an arrangement the
court acknowledged was plainly within the terms of the FCPA.97 The
Fifth Circuit, via the adopted district court opinion, relied exclusively
on Gebardi and the FCPA’s text and legislative history to reach its
holding.98
Contrary to the drug-kingpin cases discussed above, the adopted
district court opinion paid attention to the nuances of the Gebardi
opinion—or at least attempted to.99 But even though the court
recognized Gebardi’s emphasis on “acquiescence,”100 it failed to

94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–dd-3 (2018) (prohibiting, in turn, issuers of securities on
American exchanges, “any domestic concern,” or any person acting “while in the territory of the
United States”—or any employees or agents of these—from making the payments described).
95. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
96. Id. at 831–32. Even when counting the district court’s order, as appended to the appellate
decision, the entire opinion is an economical six pages.
97. Id. at 832. Specifically, the FCPA prohibits making “an offer, payment, promise to pay,
or authorization of the payment of any money—” to “any foreign official” with the purpose of
“influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd1.
98. Castle, 925 F.2d at 832–36 (referencing only Gebardi, the FCPA statute, and legislative
history).
99. Indeed, the trial court devoted two of its order’s five pages to discussion of Gebardi. See
id. at 832–33 (discussing Gebardi).
100. See id. at 833 (“Yet the [Mann] Act did not make the woman’s consent a
crime. . . . Congress evinced an affirmative legislative policy ‘to leave her acquiescence
unpunished.’ A necessary implication . . . was that the woman’s agreement to participate was
immune.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112,
123 (1932))).
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attribute any significance whatsoever to this qualification, and it failed
to acknowledge the “moving spirit” language in the opinion. Moreover,
the court inaccurately suggested that both the FCPA and the Mann Act
punished conduct which “necessarily involved the agreement of at least
two people”;101 in fact, neither statute’s prohibited conduct necessarily
requires such agreement.102 If they did, Wharton’s Rule would control.
But the Gebardi Court was clear that the use of force or threat would
effectuate a Mann Act violation without agreement,103 and the FCPA
can be violated by a mere unsolicited offer of a bribe.104 Nonetheless,
the Castle court interpreted Gebardi’s principle as vindicating
congressional intent to exempt from liability one party necessary to an
agreement.105 The court ultimately concluded this principle “squarely
applie[d]” to immunize foreign officials who accept bribes from all
derivative FCPA liability.106
Finally, and perhaps most fatally, the Castle court determined that
the Gebardi Court could not have been concerned with only a
“protected” class, because the Court had “built its analysis on
Congress’ clear intention . . . to exempt the transported women from
all prosecutions for their involvement in the prohibited activities.”107
While the “protected class” reading of Gebardi may not be the most
accurate,108 the Fifth Circuit’s repudiation of this theory is nonetheless
entirely incompatible with the Gebardi opinion itself. Gebardi, for
better or for worse, declined to overrule Holte and explicitly left room

101. Id.
102. Michael F. Dearington, Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court’s Sudden
Expansion of Conspiracy Liability (And Why Bribe-Taking Foreign Officials Should Take Note),
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 204, 223–24 (2017) (supporting the Castle decision while
conceding it was “doubly incorrect” in reaching this conclusion and that it “overstated the
strength of [the legislative history] argument”).
103. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 122.
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful . . . to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money . . . .” (emphasis added)); cf. United
States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 744 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that Wharton’s Rule did not apply to
the context of the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) and thus did not cause that violation to merge
with a separate conspiracy charge because it is possible to violate the AKS just by soliciting a
kickback; cooperative action was not necessarily required).
105. Castle, 925 F.2d at 833.
106. Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the argument that Gebardi only exempted
“protected” persons—the position the Seventh Circuit had enunciated in the Pino-Perez decision
just two years prior. See id.; supra note 83 and accompanying text.
107. Castle, 925 F.2d at 833–34.
108. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
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for a woman transported in violation of the Mann Act to be prosecuted
under certain circumstances; namely, where she was “the active or
moving spirit.”109 Thus, because the Supreme Court actually had been
willing to draw finer distinctions within the broad class of “transported
women”—contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s assertion—it is entirely
consistent that the Gebardi exception applies to only a subset of the
actors whose conduct could be an “inseparable incident,” be it a
transported woman or a foreign bribe taker.
Applying a correct reading of Gebardi to the FCPA bribe-taker
context, then, leads to the conclusion that a foreign official
theoretically could be liable for conspiracy if he did more than merely
acquiesce to the offer of a bribe. At step one, the Gebardi exception
should apply to the FCPA. Like the Mann Act, the FCPA does not
necessarily require another person’s agreement, but certainly
contemplates that agreement in the typical case. Bribes may be offered
with no expectation of return, but the FCPA does specifically
encompass and contemplate quid pro quo arrangements as the typical
violations, which would involve some agreement from the bribe
recipient.110 And because agreeing to accept a bribe would be an
“inseparable incident” of the FCPA offense itself, that mere agreement
could not be charged as a conspiracy. Step two of the inquiry would
then call for examination of the defendant’s mens rea and level of
participation in the scheme, an inquiry which could very well implicate
corrupt foreign officials as conspirators.
Because the FCPA is litigated so infrequently, the Castle decision
has stood as the de facto authority on the question of liability for bribetaking foreign officials. The government has even incorporated the
decision into its FCPA Resource Guide.111 For the same reason, it
would take another twenty-seven years for an appellate court to
consider the statute’s application to a different class of actors in
Hoskins.
In 2015, the United States indicted Lawrence Hoskins for
conspiring to bribe Indonesian officials into awarding a $118 million
109. See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932).
110. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2018) (prohibiting payments or offers to
induce a foreign official “to do or omit to do any act in violation of [his] lawful duty”).
111. Dearington, supra note 102, at 224–25; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 48–49 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GUB2-7FLC] (citing Castle for the guidance that “foreign officials cannot be
prosecuted for FCPA violations”).
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contract to an American company.112 Hoskins, a U.K. citizen, was a
Senior Vice President for the French power giant Alstom S.A.113 The
bribery scheme centered, however, on Alstom’s American subsidiary,
Alstom Power, Inc. (“Alstom U.S.”).114 While Hoskins was never
employed by the Connecticut-based Alstom U.S., the government
alleged that he worked closely with this subsidiary to develop and
implement the bribery scheme.115 Specifically, he approved the
selection of two consultants and authorized payments to them from
Alstom U.S.116 Hoskins knew, the government contended, that these
consultants were then steering these payments to Indonesian officials
in exchange for their influence and assistance with awarding the
massive contract.117 Several parts of the scheme were alleged to have
taken place in the United States, although Hoskins himself remained
abroad throughout its duration.118
While the Second Circuit acknowledged that the FCPA plainly
prohibited the alleged scheme,119 it determined that the FCPA
prohibited the conduct of only three specific categories of defendants:
(1) companies traded on a U.S. stock exchange and their agents, (2)
American companies and persons, and (3) foreign persons or
businesses acting while in the United States.120 Hoskins—a foreign
citizen, working abroad, for a foreign company—was none of these.
Thus, he was incapable of violating the FCPA directly.121
112. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 2018). Hoskins’s coconspirators were
charged separately. Third Superseding Indictment at 1, 2, 6, United States v. Hoskins, No. 3:12cr-00238-JBA, 2015 WL 11018855 (D. Conn. Apr. 15, 2015).
113. Hoskins worked directly for Alstom U.K., a subsidiary of Alstom S.A., and was also
assigned to Alstom Resources Management—a France-based division of Alstom S.A.—during
the conspiracy. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 77 (acknowledging that “if Hoskins did what the indictment charges, he would
appear to be guilty of conspiracy to violate the FCPA,” before laying out the court’s exception).
120. Id. at 71.
121. The government also charged Hoskins with other substantive offenses including money
laundering, which were not dismissed, and also alleged an alternative theory of FCPA liability
that would not implicate the court’s exception. Id. at 72–73 (listing the seven indictment charges
on appeal); id. at 98 (allowing certain counts to proceed). Under this theory, Hoskins acted as an
agent of Alstom U.S., which would make him one of the statutorily-specified actors. See id. at 97–
98 (describing the government’s alternative theory); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (prohibiting the
conduct of “domestic concern[s]” and their “employee[s]” and “agent[s]”). This would thus
remove him from the protection of even the Second Circuit’s broad exception. Hoskins, 902 F.3d
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Despite acknowledging that the government’s theory122 rested on
the “firm baseline rule” that began this Note—that a person may be
liable for a conspiracy even though he could not have committed the
substantive offense123—the Second Circuit relied on Gebardi and its
earlier Amen decision to announce its affirmative-legislative-policy
exception to conspiracy liability.124 In deriving this exception, this
opinion provided one of the most extensive appellate court discussions
of Gebardi since that decision was issued, but nonetheless missed the
mark on two of its fundamental takeaways. The first error expanded
when this inquiry should be conducted, while the second error
expanded who gets excluded under a given statute.
The first major error relates to assessing which statutes are
appropriate candidates for the Gebardi exception. The Hoskins panel
dismissed the Gebardi Court’s focus on a statutory offense with
“inseparable incidents” and instead derived from the case an invitation
to forage for a legislative policy to exclude classes of actors from
conspiracy liability in any case where the underlying statute explicitly
punishes some other class. The court initially conceded that the firm
baseline rule of conspiracy law would generally foreclose the court’s
policy search.125 To overcome the baseline rule, the court relied on
language from Gebardi indicating that the circumstances of that case
presented “something more than an agreement between two persons
for one of them to commit an offense which the other cannot
commit.”126 But recall that the Gebardi Court’s analysis that the case
involved “something more” was simply a recognition of the interaction
between the conspiracy statute and the underlying Mann Act offense:
that a woman’s acquiescence was an “inseparable incident” in all cases
where a woman was transported voluntarily,127 and therefore the two

at 98 (“Provided that the government makes this showing [of agency], there is no affirmative
legislative policy to leave his conduct unpunished . . . .”). This Note is only concerned with the
government’s primary theory and the heart of the Second Circuit’s opinion: conspiracy to violate
the FCPA by an actor not formally affiliated with the principal bribe offeror.
122. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73, 78 (discussing the government’s original motion in limine and
then its argument on appeal).
123. Id. at 77.
124. Id. at 77, 80.
125. Id. at 80 (acknowledging that the baseline rule mandates that “we cannot identify [an
affirmative legislative policy] whenever a statute focuses on certain categories of persons at the
exclusion of others”).
126. Id. (quoting Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932)).
127. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.
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offenses would merge where a conspiracy was based only on that “mere
acquiescence.”
To be sure, the Hoskins court acknowledged the role that this
“something more” language played in the Gebardi opinion.128 But
rather than accepting it as merely the threshold inquiry used to
determine when to consider applying the Gebardi exception—when
the statute includes an unpunished “inseparable incident”—the
Second Circuit took the standalone phrase “something more” out of
context as nonspecific criteria sufficient to circumvent the baseline rule
and search for any evidence of legislative intent to exclude a class of
actors from liability.129 The court analogized the “something more”
language in Gebardi with what it viewed as the distinctive
consideration in its prior Amen decision: a legislative policy to punish
“the top brass in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot
soldiers.”130 This extraordinarily broad conception of the element
necessary to remove a case from the typical parameters of conspiracy
law demonstrates that the Second Circuit’s “something more” is in fact
rudderless as a first step. The court effectively confirmed this
assessment by moving past the text of the FCPA and pointing to a
policy derived from legislative history as the “something more” that
purportedly acted as the trigger for the exercise.131
To demonstrate the inversion at work here, consider the seminal
case cited for the baseline principle that began this Note: Rabinowich.
That case concerned a conspiracy to conceal assets from a bankruptcy
trustee.132 There are no third parties mentioned in the bankruptcy

128. See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 80 (identifying the “inseparable incident” component of the
Mann Act violation in Gebardi as the “something more” warranting an exception to conspiracy
liability (quoting and citing Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–23)).
129. Once a court has identified “something more” to enable the inquiry, such a policy is to
be derived by looking to “the statute’s text, structure, and legislative history.” Id. at 80–81. It is
important to note here that the Second Circuit was faced with a case where conspiracy liability
plainly would lie but for this or some other doctrine. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
Because this was not a case involving an ambiguous statute, further inquiries into legislative intent
beyond the statute’s text would typically be disfavored. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”).
130. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 80 (quoting United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381 (1987)).
131. See id. at 84–85 (reviewing the FCPA’s text and structure to find “utter silence” on the
question at hand, and then beginning the review of legislative history by observing that “[t]he
question thus becomes whether there is ‘something more,’ a policy basis for Congress to exclude
Hoskins’s category of defendants from criminal liability”); id. at 93 (summarizing that review by
noting that “[t]he strands of legislative history demonstrate, in several ways, the affirmative policy
described above . . . .”).
132. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 84 (1915).
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statute, and thus the conspiracy defendants—some of whom were not
themselves bankrupt—were not all directly liable.133 In Rabinowich,
the omission of named third parties from the statute presented no
hurdle to the conspiracy prosecution, and the case was allowed to
proceed without any consideration of policy or legislative history.134
Under the Second Circuit’s approach, however, there is no initial
screen for inseparable incidents. So, instead of applying the default rule
as they have for one hundred years, courts would be invited to search
for “something more” to justify an exception—some policy to punish
the bankrupt alone. To find this, they could explore the text, structure,
and legislative history.
The court’s second major error concerns the scope of actors
excluded in a particular case once a court invokes the Gebardi
exception. The Second Circuit panel correctly recognized several of the
key qualifying aspects of Gebardi’s holding—those focusing on
individual conduct and intent—when it summarized the case, but failed
to accord them any significance when announcing the rule it derived
from the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Hoskins court conceded that
Gebardi did not exempt all women transported across state lines for
illegal purposes, and that the Supreme Court held instead “that
Congress intended for the women not to be liable for at least some class
of violations of the [Mann] Act.”135 Moreover, the Hoskins court
repeatedly acknowledged Gebardi’s emphasis on the woman’s consent
and acquiescence,136 and even suggested that holding rested on this
determination: “Because the defendant in Gebardi had merely
consented to her transportation, the Court ruled that her conviction for
conspiracy could not stand . . . .”137
Given the repeated recognition of these qualifications, it is odd
indeed that the Second Circuit ignored them when it came time to
articulate who is eligible for the Gebardi exception once it has been
invoked. Despite its previous acknowledgments to the contrary, the
133. Id. at 84–86.
134. Id. at 86–88.
135. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 78 (emphasis added).
136. E.g., id. (“[T]he Court determined it could not ‘infer that the mere acquiescence of the
woman transported was intended to be condemned by the general language punishing those who
aid and assist the transporter.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S.
112, 119 (1932))); id. at 79 (“Congress intended to leave the woman unpunished when she merely
acquiesced in her own illegal transportation . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. (“[T]his
acquiescence . . . was not made a crime under the Mann Act itself.” (omission in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121)).
137. Id. (emphasis added).
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Second Circuit concluded that the only relevant portion of Gebardi was
the Court’s invocation of an “affirmative legislative policy” behind the
Mann Act. However, even this language is actually bookended in the
original Gebardi opinion by qualifying language of criminal intent and
participation: “[W]e perceive in the failure of the Mann Act to
condemn the woman’s participation in those transportations which are
effected with her mere consent, evidence of an affirmative legislative
policy to leave her acquiescence unpunished.”138 In announcing its
broad affirmative-legislative-policy exception to conspiracy liability,139
the court made no mention of Gebardi’s emphasis on the defendant’s
participation and intent. Instead, the announced rule excludes
defendants from conspiracy liability where “it is clear from the
structure of a legislative scheme140 that the lawmaker must have
intended that accomplice liability not extend to certain persons whose
conduct might otherwise fall within the general common-law or
statutory definition of complicity.”141 The court’s descriptions of the
affected categories of actors—“certain . . . persons,” and the equally
unhelpful “some type of participant”142—admit no limits. Under this
approach, legislative policy, however discerned, is the only factor by
which classes of actors are identified and selectively excluded from
conspiracy liability. While other courts had expanded the scope of
excluded actors on a categorical basis, this error is magnified when such
determinations are no longer limited to statutes with “inseparable
incidents”—a Pandora’s Box opened by the court’s threshold error. By
eliding both steps of the Gebardi opinion’s two-step inquiry and
instead considering only legislative policy for both when and to whom
the exception applies, the Hoskins court created an exception that

138. Id. at 79–80 (emphasis added) (quoting Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123).
139. Ironically, the Second Circuit characterized its exception as “narrowly circumscribed.”
Id. at 77.
140. The court paid homage to “the structure of a legislative scheme” in this articulation of
its rule, but recall that the “something more” identified as the key to unlock legislative history in
Hoskins was itself derived from legislative history, not statutory structure. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
141. Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 78. If, however, statutory structure were the guiding light suggested
by the quote, query how the court was satisfied on that account when the statute before them
offered “utter silence regarding the class of defendants involved in this case.” Id. at 84. The court
also framed its exception without reference to structure—and perhaps more accurately—by
observing that: “[C]onspiracy and complicity liability will not lie when Congress demonstrates an
affirmative legislative policy to leave some type of participant in a criminal transaction
unpunished . . . .” Id. at 80 (citing Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123).
142. Id.
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could swallow a baseline rule of conspiracy liability.143 As Judge Posner
wrote in response to the Second Circuit’s previous and more cursory
iteration of this analysis in Amen, “It would introduce great uncertainty
into federal criminal law if the liability of a conceded aider and abettor
depended on the results of an inquiry into Congress’s intent concerning
such liability in creating the offense.”144
*
*
*
This sampling of cases illustrates, at the very least, that the lower
courts cannot agree on what Gebardi means or on how far conspiracy
liability really extends for a variety of statutes. Some circuits have
identified in Gebardi a relatively narrow exclusion for a “protected
class” of individuals, and cast statutory distinctions at relatively fine
levels—as in Pino-Perez, where the Seventh Circuit distinguished
criminal-enterprise employees from those outsiders who assist the
kingpin. But others have recognized an increasingly broad exclusion
with little room for nuance. Amen recognized only a criminal
enterprise’s leaders or nonleaders, and Hoskins drew a bright line
between actors specifically covered by the FCPA and all others.
However, in these cases, courts have either neglected or declined to
give precedential credence to Gebardi’s emphasis on acquiescence and
moving spirits. And while this confusion could be explained, in part, by
the lower courts’ operating for the last eighty-odd years with little
guidance in this realm, in 2016 the Supreme Court finally stepped in.
Unfortunately, this case failed to fully resolve the confusion.
III. BACK TO THE ROOTS: A RETURN TO MENS REA
This Note’s proposed focus on mens rea is not unique. This Part
begins by discussing the Supreme Court’s most recent treatment of
Gebardi in 2016, including how that treatment provided an essentially
correct and intent-oriented interpretation of the exception but failed
to definitively set the record straight. Section B then turns to clarifying
and adding gloss to the Court’s comments to provide a workable
reading going forward.

143. The panel was not unanimous, however, in announcing this exceedingly broad
exception. Judge Lynch concurred in the judgment on an alternative basis but was not persuaded
that “Gebardi opens a broad door to finding ‘legislative policy’ exceptions to the general principle
that persons outside defined legislative categories of principal liability may still be guilty of
conspiracy and complicity.” Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 100 (Lynch, J., concurring).
144. United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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A. The Missed Opportunity: Ocasio v. United States
In early 2012, Samuel Ocasio, a former Baltimore police officer,
was convicted under the Hobbs Act145 for his participation in a smalltime kickback scheme with the Majestic Auto Repair Shop
(“Majestic”).146 Whenever Ocasio and his fellow officers-cumcoconspirators147 reported to the scene of a car accident, they would
direct owners of damaged vehicles to take their business to Majestic,
and would then receive cash payments from the shop owners in
exchange.148 The Hobbs Act criminalizes “extortion,” which it defines,
rather awkwardly, as “the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”149 Ocasio was charged
via the latter prong, extortion “under color of official right.”150 This is
“the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a
bribe.’”151 Thus, this kind of “extortion” functionally means using a
position of power to induce someone to part with money, instead of
using fear or violence.152 In addition to substantive violations of the
Hobbs Act, Ocasio was also charged with and convicted of conspiracy
to violate the Hobbs Act—the conspiracy including fellow officers and
Majestic’s owners.153
Ocasio argued that a conspiracy to obtain property “from another”
could not logically include seeking money from a member of the
conspiracy itself—there, the shop owners.154 He sought a jury
instruction suggesting the law required “that the conspiracy was to
obtain money or property from some person who was not a member of
the conspiracy.”155 The argued-for instruction represented one side of
an argument that had been the subject of a circuit split. The Sixth
Circuit had previously taken Ocasio’s position—that money had to be
sought from a nonconspirator—while the Fourth Circuit had rejected
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018).
146. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1427 (2016).
147. The Court noted that as many as sixty Baltimore police officers were implicated in the
scheme. Id.
148. Id.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)–(b)(2).
150. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1427.
151. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992).
152. 31A AM. JUR. 2d Extortion, Blackmail and Threats § 83 (2019).
153. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1428.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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this limitation.156 The Supreme Court sided with the Fourth Circuit’s
view and affirmed Ocasio’s conspiracy conviction.157
The Court’s holding rested primarily on the “longstanding
principles of conspiracy law”158 with which this Note began. First, a
conspirator does not need to agree to commit the offense himself; he
just needs to agree that “the underlying crime be committed by some
member of the conspiracy.”159 Second, the Court invoked the nowfamiliar principle that someone can conspire to commit a crime he
cannot commit himself.160 To illustrate how these principles applied
there, the Court turned to Holte and Gebardi.161
The Court recognized the holding from Holte that even if a
transported woman could not violate the Mann Act herself, she could
still theoretically be liable for conspiring to violate it.162 The Court
suggested Gebardi “expanded on these points,” by “fully accept[ing]
Holte’s holding.”163 Gebardi’s gloss, the Ocasio Court suggested, was
its recognition that the woman in that case was not “the active or
moving spirit in conceiving or carrying out the transportation,” and
that “mere consent” or “acquiescence” was not enough for a
conspiracy conviction.164 The Court said these cases together “make
perfectly clear” that: (1) “a person may be convicted of conspiring to
commit a substantive offense that he or she cannot personally commit,”
and (2) that “when that person’s consent or acquiescence is inherent in
the underlying substantive offense, something more than bare consent
or acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person was a
conspirator.”165

156. Compare United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 767–71 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting Hobbs
Act conspiracy liability for two bail bondsmen who made payments to a court clerk in exchange
for records), with United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1269–70, 1278–79 (4th Cir. 1986)
(affirming a Hobbs Act–conspiracy conviction for a highway-inspection company’s vice president
who had provided valuable items to a state highway official in exchange for approval of
fraudulently inflated bills).
157. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1429.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. at 1430 (citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915)).
161. Id. at 1431.
162. Id. (citing United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1915)). The Court also invoked
Holte’s hypothetical blackmailing, train-ticket-purchasing woman. Id. at 1431 n.3.
163. Id. at 1431 (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 116–17 (1932)).
164. Id. (quoting Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 117, 123).
165. Id. at 1432.
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The Court applied these principles collectively to Ocasio’s case
and held that a conspiracy only requires an agreement that one person
execute the agreed-to crime; here, obtaining property “from another”
under color of official right.166 There, the whole group had conspired
for Ocasio and the officers to obtain property from the shop owners.167
It did not matter that the shop owners could not have extorted
themselves, and thus could not have violated the statute on their own.
The whole group did not need to agree to each commit the violation;
rather, they could all agree for one coconspirator to take property from
someone else, including another coconspirator.
Ocasio argued that in every case, this approach would cause the
substantive offense of extortion to merge with the conspiracy to
commit extortion.168 The substantive offense of Hobbs Act extortion
requires the property be obtained “with [the other’s] consent,” so
Ocasio argued that such consent could theoretically be the basis for a
separate conspiracy charge in every case.169 But the Court had no
trouble dismissing this slippery slope argument, because the “consent”
required by the Hobbs Act represented only a minimal acquiescence,
such as to distinguish extortion from robbery.170 And as Gebardi
illustrated, “such ‘consent’ is quite different from the mens rea
necessary for a conspiracy.”171 In fact, the Court drew an explicit
connection between the transported woman’s “mere acquiescence”
and the extorted party’s “minimal consent,” such that a conspiracy
charge in this area would require a greater degree of culpability than
the statutory consent.172
This Note argues that this is essentially the correct way to read
Gebardi and Holte, if a bit imprecise. And while a page and a half of
analysis of these cases is their most significant treatment by the
Supreme Court in the last eighty-six years,173 several questions remain.
166. Id. at 1433.
167. Id. at 1433–34.
168. Id. at 1435.
169. Id.
170. Id. “Robbery” is defined in the Hobbs Act as “obtaining of personal property from the
person or in the presence of another, against his will.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (2018) (emphasis
added).
171. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1435.
172. Id. at 1435–36.
173. See, e.g., Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 820–21 (2009) (citing Gebardi in
dicta as one example where the Court had declined to impose complicity liability on one party to
a transaction that a statute treated more leniently than the other party, before conceding that the
listed cases did not control); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 774 n.8, 775 (1975) (citing
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The Court’s discussion was too cursory in condensing the nuance of the
Gebardi opinion, leaving a wide berth for commentators to criticize174
and for lower courts to distinguish175 the Court’s approach. Moreover,
the case raises several practical questions for lower courts trying to
apply its guidance. The next Section attempts to fill in some of these
gaps.
B. Looking Ahead: The Mens Rea approach to Conspiracy for
Inseparable Incidents
Ocasio has laid the groundwork for a consistent approach to
applying Gebardi in the federal courts, but further guidance is needed.
The groundwork begins with Ocasio’s concise statement of Gebardi’s
holding: “[W]hen [a] person’s consent or acquiescence is inherent in
the underlying substantive offense, something more than bare consent
or acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person was a
conspirator.”176 Implicit in this concise statement is the two-part
Gebardi inquiry advanced above177: (1) an assessment of the
substantive offense statute to determine if Gebardi even applies (the
“inseparable incident” or “inherent consent” prong); and (2) an
assessment of the specific defendant’s conduct (“something more than
bare consent or acquiescence”). Together, these prongs represent a
heightened focus on the necessary mens rea, or criminal intent, for
these kinds of “inseparable incident” conspiracy charges—a focus
derived both from the face of a statute and from the particular
defendant.
Of course, as Justice Sotomayor rightly pointed out in her Ocasio
dissent, the Court did not tell us what, precisely, constitutes “something
Gebardi only for recitation of Wharton’s Rule); Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 680 (1959)
(citing Gebardi with a “cf.” signal for the suggestion that conspiracy should require knowledge of
the criminal conduct); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (citing Gebardi in dicta
for conspiracy exceptions that were not available to the defendants there); Direct Sales Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 703, 714 n.10 (1943) (citing Gebardi with a “cf.” signal to support the
proposition that the relevant statute had not implicitly exempted certain actors from conspiracy).
174. See, e.g., Dearington, supra note 102, at 214–20 (arguing that the Ocasio Court
overlooked Gebardi’s analysis of the statutory text and that it paid insufficient attention to
legislative intent); Wee, supra note 18, at 129 (declining to attribute significance to the Ocasio
Court’s “cursory treatment” of Gebardi, while suggesting Justice Sotomayor’s dissent provided a
better approach). But see Wee, supra note 18, at 145 (suggesting nonetheless that Ocasio gives
cause to “question how durable the broader variant of the Gebardi principle would be”).
175. See United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 83 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding no demonstration
of an affirmative-legislative-policy exception).
176. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432.
177. See supra Part I.C.
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more than bare consent or acquiescence,” and so we must ask, as she
did, “When does mere ‘consent’ tip over into conspiracy?”178
Thankfully, we are not without clues. The Court has provided at least
one example that draws this distinction: Holte’s hypothetical
blackmailing, train-ticket-purchasing woman.179 The Gebardi Court
fairly contrasted its case with this hypothetical by saying there was no
evidence the woman there, Louise Rolfe, was “the active or moving
spirit in conceiving or carrying out the transportation.”180 The contrast
demonstrates that initiative and corrupt motive—some improper
personal gain—are relevant factors.
In the bribery context specifically, Ocasio’s Fourth Circuit
predecessor, United States v. Spitler,181 provided further clues. There, a
highway-inspection company executive had provided gifts, including
“an Uzi semi-automatic weapon . . . a lady’s diamond ring, and a onehundred-ounce silver bar,” to a state highway official in exchange for
approving his company’s inflated bills.182 The Fourth Circuit held that
the executive had conspired with the official to violate the Hobbs Act
and was not a “mere extortion victim.”183 The executive advanced
essentially the same argument that Samuel Ocasio would present
several decades later: that Gebardi prevented the bribe payor from
being prosecuted as an accomplice or conspirator to his own
“extortion.”184 The court examined the interaction between Holte and
Gebardi and reached largely the same conclusion that the Supreme
Court would later reach in Ocasio.185 And while the court did pause at
the question of “[t]he degree of activity necessary” to tip the scales
from acquiescence into “moving spirit,” it surveyed past cases and
identified a common thread.186 Where a bribe payor assumed a role
involving “more than the mere payment of money,” such as where he
had “actively solicited and procured” or “actively induced” the

178. Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
179. United States v. Holte, 23 U.S. 140, 145 (1915); see supra note 48 and accompanying text
(discussing the Holte hypothetical).
180. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932).
181. United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986).
182. Id. at 1270.
183. Id. at 1277–78.
184. Id. at 1275.
185. See id. at 1276 (finding that when an individual exhibits conduct more active than mere
acquiescence, he or she may be subject to conspiracy liability).
186. Id. at 1277.
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recipient’s “extortion,” then he would be subject to complicity and
conspiracy liability.187
Finally, while not a precise fit, this notion of an “active or moving
spirit” at least echoes language courts are intimately familiar with:
Judge Learned Hand’s Peoni standard for accomplice liability. The
Peoni standard is that one aids or abets a principal actor in committing
a crime when he “in some sort associate[s] himself with the venture,
that he participate[s] in it as in something that he wishes to bring about,
that he seek[s] by his action to make it succeed.”188 This standard has
built-in limitations,189 such that the minimal agreement necessary for a
transaction may not rise to the level of “something that [one] wishes to
bring about.”190 Moreover, this standard illustrates that federal courts
are no strangers to flexible, subjective determinations of culpability for
non-principal actors.
This question of the necessary level of conduct and intent trains
on the second prong of this Note’s proposed Gebardi exception: “to
whom” the exception specifically applies in a given statutory context.191
But the harder question for lower courts may actually occur at step one
of the proposed Gebardi inquiry: determining which statutes
inherently implicate an actor’s consent without specifically punishing
that actor—the “when” prong. In responding to one of Ocasio’s
arguments, the Court implicitly agreed with the defendant that
Gebardi could create an exception in the Hobbs Act context—just not
one that covered the defendants there.192 But the Court failed to clarify
any other contexts to which Gebardi would apply.
The Ocasio Court’s only direction on this point lies in its brisk
statement of Gebardi’s exception: “[W]hen [a] person’s consent or
187. Id. at 1278. Note that the party directly punished in the Hobbs Act extortion/bribery
scheme is the opposite of that in the FCPA bribery context. The Hobbs Act punishes the extorter,
or receiver of bribes, supra note 149 and accompanying text, while the FCPA punishes the offeror,
supra note 104.
188. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
189. See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1237 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (noting
that the Learned Hand standard has limitations “built into it,” such that “a policeman who took
an isolated bribe from a kingpin” would not be aiding and abetting the kingpin because “[a]iding
and abetting implies a fuller engagement with the kingpin’s activities”).
190. See id. at 1235.
191. As noted above, supra note 65, this second step of conduct-and-intent examination has
been missing from past commentary.
192. See Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1435–36 (2016) (clarifying that even though
the Hobbs Act did require some minimal consent in every case, every case would not
automatically implicate a conspiracy because the additional requisite mens rea would be not be
present in all bribe payors, such as those who merely complied with threatening demands).
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acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive offense . . . .”193
This language lends itself to interpretations that would not capture all
the applicable statutes, so a clarification is necessary. For example, this
language could be read to exclude even the situation in Gebardi. It is
not clear that a woman’s consent is “inherent in the underlying
substantive offense”194 of violating the Mann Act, because a woman’s
consent was not absolutely necessary to transport her across state lines
and violate the Mann Act. Of course, a correct reading of Gebardi’s
exception must apply to Gebardi itself, so the correct reading must add
gloss to the Ocasio Court’s statement.
A workable formulation could simply build on that statement to
clarify its scope: a person is exempted from conspiracy liability when
her consent or acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive
offense, as committed in a way expressly contemplated by statute.
“Contemplated” here means that the statute creating the substantive
offense expressly recognizes some person’s existence as necessary to
commit the crime, but is indifferent to that person’s consent. This
would clarify that the exception is not as narrow as Wharton’s Rule,
but is also not so broad as to apply in all instances where at least one
actor is specified by a criminal statute. The statutes discussed in this
Note illustrate this distinction: The Mann Act made explicit reference
to “a woman or girl” without requiring her consent, and the Hobbs Act
makes explicit reference to the “other” from which money is taken
without requiring that this “other” independently offer it. In contrast,
the kingpin statute acknowledges the necessary subordinates but does
not expressly contemplate any other actors, so the Gebardi exception
would not apply to these “nonemployees.”195 The cases in the FCPA
context have presented both situations. The statute makes explicit
reference to foreign officials without requiring they accept the offered
bribes, so these actors should be able to invoke the exception in
appropriate cases—for example, where they find an unsolicited
briefcase of cash on their desk with a note requesting a favor.
Conversely, the FCPA does not expressly contemplate foreign nongovernment actors, like Lawrence Hoskins, who coordinate domestic

193. Id. at 1432.
194. Id.
195. The subordinates would be excepted from conspiracy liability by Wharton’s Rule
because their consent is absolutely necessary to establish the criminal enterprise over which the
kingpin reigns.
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conduct from abroad. Thus, a correct reading of Gebardi offers
Hoskins no protection.
Beyond these practical questions, some have also argued that the
Ocasio opinion failed to engage deeply with Gebardi’s discussion of
“legislative policy” and the specific contours of the Mann Act’s text.196
These arguments are not without merit—Ocasio did not discuss these
elements at any length—but they do not spoil what that opinion got
right about Gebardi. As discussed above,197 the Gebardi opinion’s
“affirmative legislative policy” language represented the result of the
Court’s inquiry, not an independent source of an exception. Thus,
while some observers have suggested the Gebardi opinion “turned on
congressional intent in enacting the Mann Act evidenced by the text
and legislative history of the statute,”198 this view is factually incorrect
and significantly overstates the role of congressional intent in
Gebardi.199 First, the Gebardi Court did not consider legislative history.
Second, it did not set out to identify a policy of excluding liability—one
presented itself to the Court from the statute’s interaction with
conspiracy law.200 Accordingly, that the Ocasio opinion did not discuss
legislative intent does not affect the validity of that opinion’s focus on
context and conduct.
Additionally, there could be some dispute over the type of conduct
that is properly excluded under Gebardi. This Note and Ocasio
advance the position that only conduct resembling “mere
acquiescence” is excepted from conspiracy liability under Gebardi. In
arguing the view that Ocasio was mistaken, one commentator cast
Gebardi as excluding any conduct that is “frequently, if not normally”
part of the substantive crime’s conduct but is omitted from express
punishment.201 This overinclusive exception could feasibly exclude, for
example, a bribe-taking official’s solicitation of the bribe. But this
196. See Dearington, supra note 102, at 214–20 (explaining that the Ocasio Court ignored the
Hobbs Act’s legislative intent in reaching its decision).
197. See supra Part I.C.
198. Dearington, supra note 102, at 212, 215.
199. For example, attorney Michael Dearington supports the claim that Gebardi invoked
legislative history by pointing to the Gebardi Court’s use of the phrase “Congress set out in the
Mann Act to . . . .” Id. at 211 (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932)). But the
Court provided no “evidence” of this intent—no legislative records nor floor debates. Instead,
the Court effectively took notice of this intent from the face of the statute and the nature of the
crime. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121.
200. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123 (inferring the policy behind the Mann Act by reasoning
that the Mann Act would contravene itself if interpreted differently).
201. Dearington, supra note 102, at 217.
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perspective is not consistent with the Gebardi Court’s willingness to
parse conduct rising above “mere consent”202 and the holding that
women who acted as the “moving spirit” of the offense would still be
culpable.203 Further, anything more than acquiescence would cease to
be an “inseparable incident of all cases in which the [actor] is a
voluntary agent at all,”204 and thus the agreement would no longer
merge with the substantive offense—removing the justification for the
exception. And this makes sense, because it was the tension between
the conspiracy statute and the near-ubiquitous consent in Mann Act
violations that gave the Court pause in the first place.205
Finally, in the Hoskins decision, announced two years after
Ocasio, the Second Circuit distinguished Ocasio in a brief discussion
suggesting that decision was limited to the Hobbs Act context.206 While
the Hoskins court acknowledged that the recent opinion had
considered Gebardi’s application to a statute with omitted actors,207 it
believed that Ocasio “d[id] not demonstrate a narrowing of the
affirmative-legislative-policy exception, but simply a situation where
there was no affirmative legislative policy to leave the bribe payors
unpunished.”208 But this superficial perspective is entirely unmoored
from the Ocasio opinion, which did not recognize any affirmativelegislative-policy exception or inquire into legislative intent at all.
The Hoskins court also trained on the Hobbs Act’s awkward
language and suggested that Ocasio’s holding rested solely on issues of
sorting out what the statute actually meant—specifically the meanings
of “from another” and “extortion.”209 There is more support for this
position; sorting out those textual quirks was indeed a necessary step
to the Ocasio decision. Nonetheless, these statute-specific inquiries do
not limit the portion of Ocasio interpreting Gebardi, because that
holding was still necessary to the Court’s ultimate conclusion. The
Ocasio Court’s work was not done once it determined that extortion
202. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121.
203. Id. at 123.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 121 (“There is the added element that the offense planned, the criminal object
of the conspiracy, involves the agreement of the woman to her transportation by the man, which
is the very conspiracy charged.”).
206. United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2018).
207. Id. at 83 (“Although Ocasio arose in a setting where a statute’s language arguably
suggested that certain persons are spared from liability, the unique features of Hobbs Act
extortion limit Ocasio’s helpfulness to the government.”).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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under color of official right could be read as “paying a bribe” and that
the “from another” language only needed to apply to one
coconspirator. The Court still had to address the argument that its
reading of the Hobbs Act would implicate a separate conspiracy charge
in every case, and it needed the Gebardi exception to draw the
necessary line.210 Because of the exception, bribe payors will not always
be conspirators; rather, the Court’s answer was essentially “it
depends”—on mens rea, that is.211
CONCLUSION
Ocasio presented a golden opportunity for the Supreme Court to
resolve more than just a disagreement about the Hobbs Act, but the
Court failed to seize it. It could have resolved multiple splits in
conspiracy liability for specific offenses by providing a workable and
well-reasoned procedure for applying the interpretive rule from
Gebardi. Moreover, the Court could have clarified liability for wideranging and complex conspiracies that can take years to investigate and
uncover. Lawrence Hoskins is just one defendant in one case, but his
case represents the difficulties of enforcing the criminal laws in today’s
white-collar context, where corporate fraudsters are increasingly
sophisticated and days in court to test the law are increasingly rare.212
This Note suggests Gebardi was right not to overrule Holte, but
that is not to suggest that crime victims should be harangued as
210. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1435–36 (2016).
211. Ocasio stated:
Just as mere acquiescence in a Mann Act violation is insufficient to create a conspiracy,
the minimal ‘consent’ required to trigger [the Hobbs Act] is insufficient to form a
conspiratorial agreement. . . . In cases where the bribe payor is merely complying with
an official demand, the payor lacks the mens rea necessary for a conspiracy. . . . [T]his
mere acquiescence in the demand does not form a conspiracy.
Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121–23 (1932); United
States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915); then citing Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63–65
(1997); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211,
223 (1974); Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–23).
212. Cf. JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS
TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES 244 (2017) (“The case [against Wall Street executives involved in
Enron fraud] fell, a victim of one of the many rulings from appellate courts in recent years that
have raised the bar on white-collar corporate prosecutions.”); Duke University School of
Law, Samuel W. Buell | Capital Offenses: Business Crime & Punishment in America's Corporate
6,
2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVnYGvJP5NE
Age, Y OU T UBE (Oct.
[https://perma.cc/LRU5-562F] (extolling the value of bringing “hard” prosecutions of corporate
crime and observing that, “[t]he more complex the wrongdoing, the more it threatens to end up
basically beyond legal control—because it's too opaque; it's too complicated for the legal system
to handle”).
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potential conspirators in every case where they consent to another’s
criminal conduct. This Note’s interest is in getting right those
background, governing principles of conspiracy law that allow our
government to prosecute actors who seek to exploit statutory
loopholes with conscious, intentional, and corrupt conduct. For more
than a century, our courts have recognized broad conspiracy liability as
a means to root out the unique dangers of pernicious schemes to
“subvert[s] the laws.”213 This liability reaches the criminal who
orchestrates at arms’ length, ineligible as a principal, who fancies
himself insulated from the law. This Note’s proposed exception
provides a workable and justifiable means of drawing the boundaries
of that liability, while allowing prosecutors, courts, and juries to
conduct the requisite individualized inquiry into each defendant’s
criminal intent. Gebardi and its justifications are as sound today as they
were eighty-six years ago. It requires no more than immunity for “mere
acquiescence” and calls for no less than justice for crime’s “moving
spirits.”

213.

United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).

